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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Thirty-year-old Jess Wade was on probation for sexual battery a minor. 
After Mr. Yost admitted to violating his probation, the district court revoked probation, 
imposed his underlying twenty-five year sentence, and then reduced the fixed portion of 
his sentence from five to three years. Mr. Yost now appeals from the district court's 
order revoking probation. Mr. Yost contends that his rights under the Due Process 
Clause and Equal Protection Clause were violated by the district court's revocation of 
his probation based primarily on his indigent status. Mr. Yost also contends that the 
district court abused its discretion by revoking probation or by failing to further reduce 
his sentence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In April of 2013, Mr. Yost pied guilty to sexual battery of a minor of sixteen or 
seventeen years of age. (R., pp.53-54, 69-70, 80-81.) The district court sentenced him 
to twenty-five years, with five years fixed, and retained jurisdiction ("a rider"). (R., pp.79-
85.) At the rider review hearing in January of 2014, the district court suspended 
execution of Mr. Yost's sentence and placed him on probation for ten years. (R., pp.91-
92, 93-97.) The district court also set a status hearing for April of 2014 to evaluate 
Mr. Yost's performance on probation. (R , pp.92, 96.) 
Before the April status hearing, a Special Progress Report was provided to the 
district court. (R., p.120.) This Report stated that Mr. Yost was in compliance with most 
of the terms of his probation. (R., p.120.) At the status hearing, the district court noted 
that the "[r]eport looks positive" and told Mr. Yost to "[k]eep up the good work." 
(R., p.122.) 
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On November 20, 2014, a Report of Probation Violation was filed with the district 
(R., pp.126-29.) On January 26, 15, Mr. Yost admitted to three violations for 
1) failure to attend sex offender treatment; (2) view and possession of pornographic 
media; and (3) access to the Internet to view pornography. 1 (R., pp.126-27, 146; 
Vol. 1,2 p.8, L. 13-p.10, L.20.) With regard to the first violation, the only reason 
Mr. Yost had failed to attend treatment was because the program, H&H Treatment, 
discharged him for owing $324.00. (R., p.130.) 
At the disposition hearing on March 2, 2015, Mr. Yost's counsel explained that 
Mr. Yost had "substantially struggled" to have the funds to pay for sex offender 
treatment (Tr. Vol. I, p.16, Ls.21-24.) His counsel also explained: 
Mr. Yost understands how important that treatment is, Judge. And I think 
he actually gets a lot out of the treatment but has really struggled finding 
employment that works with that schedule and being able to pay. And 
when H&H is the only treatment provider in the vicinity, he's kind of at their 
mercy when he's unable to pay. And he understands why they would want 
to be paid in advance, but he is stuck between a veritable rock and a hard 
place where if he doesn't have the money to pay rent or those things, he's 
in violation of his probation, but if he doesn't pay for H&H, he's booted out 
of treatment and is in violation of his probation. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.18, Ls 1-14.) His counsel also argued that the other probation violations for 
accessing the Internet and viewing pornography were the result of Mr. Yost's lapse in 
treatment due to his inability to pay. (Tr. Vol. I, p.18, L.22-p.19, L.8.) Since the 
admit/deny hearing in January of 2015, however, Mr. Yost had gotten the funds to pay 
the $324.00 balance, so he was eligible to start treatment again. (Tr. Vol. I, p.17, Ls.8-
15.) In addition, Mr. Yost informed the district court that he had been clean and sober 
1 The State withdrew a fourth alleged violation regarding possession of sexually explicit 
images and videos of the victim. (R., p.146; Tr. Vol. I, p.10, L.21-p.11, L.3.) 
2 There are two transcripts on the appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, includes the 
admit/deny hearing and first disposition hearing, held on March 2, 2015. The second, 
cited as Volume 11, includes the second disposition hearing, held on June 8, 2015. 
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for almost two years, which was the longest time he had been sober since he was a 
teenager. (Tr. Vol. I, p.20, Ls.10-13.) district court decided to the disposition 
for three months to see that Mr. Yost was fully engaged in treatment, current on 
his financial obligations, and otherwise in compliance with the terms of probation. 
(Tr. VoL I, p.21, Ls.14-22.) 
On June 8, 2015, the district court held a second disposition hearing. 
(R., pp.153-54.) A second Special Progress Report provided that Mr. Yost was not in 
compliance with the terms of his probation. (R., p.150.) This Report stated that Mr. Yost 
owed money towards the cost of supervision. (R., p.150.) It also stated that Mr. Yost 
was noncompliant with the requirement of sex offender treatment for his failure to attend 
certain group or individual sessions and that Mr. Yost failed to take a "biannual 
maintenance polygraph examination." (R., p.150.) Mr. Yost's counsel again explained 
that the noncompliance was due to financial issues.3 (Tr. Vol. II, p.4, L.25-p.8, L.24.) 
Mr. Yost struggled to pay all of his expenses, including rent, the cost of supervision, the 
cost of sex offender treatment, the cost for polygraph tests, living expenses like gas and 
insurance to get to work, and other debts. (Tr. Vol. II, p.4, L.25-p.8, L.24.) The district 
court revoked probation and imposed the underlying twenty-five year sentence, with five 
years fixed. (Tr. Vol. II, p.10, Ls.13-45.) The district court then reduced the fixed portion 
of Mr. Yost's sentence to three years. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.10, Ls.16-18.) 
The district court entered an Order on Motion to Revoke Probation. (R., pp.155-
58.) Mr. Yost filed a timely notice of appeal from the district court's order. (R., pp.161-
63.) 
3 Mr. Yost also submitted documentation of his exact attendance record and the 
invoices from H&H Treatment. (Def.'s Ex. A.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court violate Mr. Yost's equal protection and due process rights 
when it revoked probation due to Mr. Yost's indigent status? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Yost's probation? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
L 
The District Court Violated Mr. Yost's Equal Protection And Due Process Rights When It 
Revoked Probation Due To Mr. Yost's Indigent Status 
Even though the district court's decision to revoke probation is a matter within the 
court's discretion, State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392 (Ct. App. 1987), the court's decision 
must be consistent with "constitutional standards." State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 606, 607 
(Ct. App. 2007). The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees 
"equal protection of the laws," and the Due Process Clause prohibits the State from 
depriving any person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. 
Const., amend. XIV. Consistent with these constitutional standards, a deprivation of 
liberty based solely on the individual's indigent status may run contrary to the 
"fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Bearden v. Georgia, 
461 U.S. 660, 672-73 (1983), see also Braaten, 144 Idaho at 608. That is so because 
"there can be no equal justice where the kind of trial"-or sentence-"a man gets 
depends on the amount of money he has." Bearden, 461 U.S. at 664 (quoting Griffin v. 
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (plurality opinion)). 
Mr. Yost contends that his equal protection and due process rights were violated 
by the district court's revocation of his probation due to his indigent status. The district 
court revoked probation because Mr. Yost failed to attend sex offender treatment, but 
the only reason Mr. Yost failed to attend treatment was due to his inability to pay. 
imprisoning Mr. Yost for his poverty is constitutionally impermissible. 
To determine whether a criminal defendant's indigence may permissibly affect 
the sentence, the Court applies a balancing test with elements of both the due process 
5 
equal protection analyses. See Braaten, 144 Idaho at 608. Separately, these two 
are as follows: 
To determine whether this differential treatment [based on indigency] 
violates the Equal Protection Clause, one must determine whether, and 
under what circumstances, a defendant's indigent status may be 
considered in the decision whether to revoke probation. This is 
substantially similar to asking directly the due process question of whether 
and when it is fundamentally unfair or arbitrary for the State to revoke 
probation when an indigent is unable to pay the fine. 
Braaten, 144 Idaho 308-09 (quoting Bearden, 461 U.S at 665-66). In Bearden, for 
example, the U.S. Supreme Court examined whether the defendant's equal protection 
and due process rights were violated by the revocation of his probation due to his failure 
to pay the imposed fine and restitution. 461 U.S at 665-73. The U.S. Supreme Court 
held that the revocation of probation was "permissible" only if the defendant "did not 
make sufficient bona fide efforts to pay his fine" or "alternate punishment is not 
adequate to meet the State's interests in punishment and deterrence." Id. at 674; see 
also id. at 672-73. Whether this issue is '·analyzed in terms of equal protection or due 
process," the factors to be considered are: "the nature of the individual interest affected, 
the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between legislative 
means and purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for effectuating the 
purpose .... " Braaten, 144 Idaho at 609 (quoting Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666 (alterations 
in original)). Imprisoning a defendant "solely because he lacks funds to pay the fine," 
without considering the reasons for the inability to pay or examining alternatives, is 
constitutionally impermissible. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 674. 
As an initial matter, Mr. Yost raises this issue under the fundamental error 
standard from State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). Under this standard, the Court may 
review an unobjected-to error for the first time on appeal if the error: "( 1) violates one or 
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more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the 
additional information not in appellate 
as to whether the failure object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not 
harmless." Id. at 228. In this case, Mr. Yost did not object to the error, and thus the 
fundamental error standard applies to his claim. Mr. Yost has the burden to demonstrate 
all three prongs of the Perry standard. Id. 
A The District Court Violated Mr. Yost's Constitutional Rights To Equal Protection 
And Due Process Of Law 
Under the first prong, Mr. Yost must show a violation of one or more unwaived 
constitutional rights. See id. Mr. Yost contends that his unwaived constitutional rights to 
due process and equal protection were violated by the district court's revocation of 
probation Using the balancing test from Bearden, Mr. Yost's individual liberty interest 
outweighed the State's penological interests, and the district court failed to consider 
alternate means to effectuate the State's interests. See Braaten, 144 Idaho at 608 
(discussing the balancing test). 
Examining the first factor of "the nature of the individual interest," Mr. Yost has a 
constitutionally-protected interest in remaining on probation. The U.S. Supreme Court 
held as much in Bearden, recognizing "the significant interest of the individual in 
remaining on probation." 461 U.S. at 671 (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 
(1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)). The Court of Appeals in Braaten 
also recognized this liberty interest. 144 Idaho at 609 C[T)he United States Supreme 
Court has held that one convicted of a crime has a significant liberty interest in 
remaining on probation or parole.") The Court of Appeals explained that this liberty 
interest "is so because [t]here is a crucial distinction between being deprived of a liberty 
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one has, as in parole, and being denied a conditional liberty that one desired." Id. at 
0 (alteration in original) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal 
442 U.S. 1, 9 (1979)). Moreover, the extent to which Mr. Yost's liberty 
interest is affected by the disposition proceeding is great-Mr. Yost's probation would 
be either revoked or reinstated based on the district court's decision. 
"The next factor to be weighed is the State's interest or purpose and the 
rationality of the connection between this purpose and the means used to accomplish 
it." Id. at 610. This factor also considers "the existence of alternate means" to effectuate 
the State's purpose. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666; see also State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 
102, 105 (2009) (discussing the required analysis of alternate means for non-willful 
violations generally). The U.S. Supreme Court has provided considerable guidance on 
this factor in the context of a revocation of probation. The U.S. Supreme Court 
cknowledged, 'The State, of course, has a fundamental interest in appropriately 
punishing persons-rich and poor-who violate its criminal laws. A defendant's poverty 
in no way immunizes him from punishment." Id. at 669. 'The decision to place the 
defendant on probation, however, reflects a determination by the sentencing court that 
the State's penological interests do not require imprisonment." Id. at 670. Thus, the 
State's interests in punishment and deterrence are diminished when the defendant is 
already determined to be an appropriate candidate for probation. Moreover, a 
probationer, such as Mr. Yost, who has made "sufficient bona fide efforts" to pay for 
treatment, and "who has complied with the other conditions of probation,"4 "has 
4 Mr. Yost acknowledges the two other probation violations for accessing the Internet 
and viewing pornography. But, as argued by his counsel, these violations occurred only 
because Mr. Yost was discharged from his treatment due to his inability to pay. (Tr. Vol. 
I, p.18, L.22-p.19, L.8.) Once Mr. Yost saved up enough money to pay for treatment 
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a willingness to pay his debt to society and an ability to conform his 
to norms. Id. This further diminishes requirement imprisonment 
the State's interests." Id. 
Certainly, the State has an interest "in rehabilitating the probationer and 
protecting society." Id. at 671. The Court of Appeals examined this interest in the 
relinquishment context: "[T]he State has a strong and legitimate interest in protecting 
society from criminals and, therefore, in disallowing probation for an offender if the 
offender cannot be adequately supervised or if his conditional release will present an 
undue risk to society." Braaten, 144 Idaho at 610. At the same time, however, a person 
cannot be punished solely for his poverty. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 671. 
Here, Mr. Yost presented an alternate means to effectuate the State's interests of 
rehabilitation and protection of society. Mr. Yost specifically requested that he meet with 
his probation officer to develop budgeting and money-management skills, with the first 
priority being payment of his supervision costs, polygraph expenses, and treatment 
fees. (Tr. Vol. II, p.6, L.25-p.7, L.11, p.8, Ls.17-24.) He also demonstrated "sufficient 
bona fide efforts" to pay for his treatment, such as working the graveyard shift and 
carrying extra money to pay for the treatment sessions. (Tr. Vol. I p.16, L.21-p.17, 
L.15, p.18, Ls.1-5; Tr. Vol. II, p.5, L.9-p.6, L.6, p.7, L.12-p.8, L.3.) (See also Def.'s Ex. 
A of Mr. Yost's payments to H&H Treatment.) There were no claims that Mr. Yost 
"willingly refused to pay" for treatment "when he ha[d] the means to pay" or that he 
demonstrated "an insufficient concern" for the requirement of treatment. Bearden, 461 
U.S. at 668. These kinds of allegations could justify imprisonment at the means to 
again, no further violations of this nature occurred. Other than the financial issues, 
Mr. Yost was in compliance with the terms of his probation. (R., p.150.) 
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effectuate the State's penological interests Id. But here, Mr. Yost recognized his need 
and tried to pay to the best his abilities. The district court failed to weigh 
factors as required by Bearden and Braaten. 
As stated in Bearden, "Only if the sentencing court determines that alternatives to 
imprisonment are not adequate in a particular situation to meet the State's interest in 
punishment and deterrence may the State imprison a probationer who has made 
sufficient bona fide efforts to pay." 461 U.S. at 672; see also id. C[T]he court must 
consider alternate measures of punishment other than imprisonment"); Sanchez, 149 
Idaho at 106. Mr. Yost submits that the district court violated his constitutional rights to 
due process and equal protection by punishing him for his indigency, without 
considering his bona fide efforts to pay and, most importantly, the alternate means to 
effectuate the State's interests. 
B. The Constitutional Violation Is Clear From The Record 
Second, Mr. Yost submits that this error is clear and plain from the record. See 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. At the second disposition hearing, the district court stated: 
All right The Court, for purposes of disposition, does still consider 
the four goals of sentencing. Certainly given the nature of the underlying 
offense, protection of society remains this Court's primary concern. 
Although, the Court does and must still consider the related goals of 
rehabilitation, retribution, and deterrence. The Court also does still 
consider those factors under 19-2521 to determine whether probation or 
some form of incarceration is appropriate. The Court does consider the 
character of the offender, the nature of the underlying offense, as well as 
Defendant's performance on probation. 
The Court is very concerned about the nature of the violation. The 
Court, after the admissions were entered, did subsequently hold 
disposition open for purposes of allowing the defendant to come into 
compliance with the terms and conditions. Certainly, the Court does 
understand the financial concerns; however, given the nature of the 
underlying offense, if the defendant does not have the financial ability to 
fully and completely participate in sex offender treatment, as required in 
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the community, certainly that treatment is available in the correctional 
setting and financial ability does not interfere. 
It does appear that while Mr. Yost did get re-engaged and began 
again attending in April of this year even then. he missed of the 
eight groups. There's still an indication, as of June 4, 2015, that the 
defendant has not scheduled his individual sessions and has not 
participated in the required maintenance polygraphs. 
Given the serious nature of the offense and the Court having 
revoked the defendant's probation, the Court will impose the sentence; 
however, the Court will modify the sentence from 25 years unified to 3 
years fixed, 22 years indeterminate not to exceed 25 .... 
(Tr. Vol. 11, p.9, L.4-p.10, L.18 (emphasis added).) Thus, the district court viewed prison 
as the solution to Mr. Yost's financial restrictions, without factoring into its analysis the 
alternate measures or Mr. Yost's efforts to pay. Further, there is no tactical or strategic 
reason for counsel to fail to object to a constitutional violation that leads directly to 
imprisonment. The error is clear from the record-the district court viewed Mr. Yost's 
inability to pay for treatment as its justification for imprisonment. See Bearden, 461 U.S. 
at 671. 
C. The Error Was Not Harmless 
Third, and finally, there is a reasonable possibility the error affected the outcome 
of the disposition proceeding. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. If Mr. Yost had the ability to 
pay for treatment, along with the cost of supervision, there is no indication from the 
record that the district court would have revoked probation. The other violations would 
not have occurred but for the lapse in treatment. The evidence indicates that Mr. Yost 
would have attended treatment as required and complied with all other terms of his 
probation. 
In summary, Mr. Yost has met his burden to show that the district court violated 
Mr. Yost's unwaived constitutional rights to due process and equal protection when it 
revoked probation based primarily on his indigent status. Further, Mr. Yost has shown 
11 
the error was clear from the record, and the error was not harmless. He respectfully 
that this Court vacate the district 
a new disposition hearing. 
II 
order revoking probation and remand 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Yost's Probation 
The district court is empowered by statute to revoke a defendant's probation 
under certain circumstances. I.C. §§ 19-2602, -2603, 20-222. The Court uses a two-
step analysis to review a probation revocation proceeding. Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 106. 
First, the Court determines "whether the defendant violated the terms of his probation." 
Id. Second, "[i]f it is determined that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his 
probation, the Court examines "what should be the consequences of that violation." Id. 
The determination of a probation violation and the determination of the consequences, if 
any, are separate analyses. Id. 
Here, Mr. Yost does not challenge his admissions to the probation violations. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.8, L.13-p.10, L.20.) "When a probationer admits to a direct violation of her 
probation agreement, no further inquiry into the question is required. State v. Peterson, 
123 Idaho 49, 50 (Ct. App. 1992). Rather, Mr. Yost submits that the district court abused 
its discretion by revoking his probation. 
"After a probation violation has been proven, the decision to revoke probation 
and pronounce sentence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court." Roy, 113 
Idaho at 392. "A judge cannot revoke probation arbitrarily," however. State v. Lee, 116 
Idaho 38, 40 (Ct. App. 1989). "The purpose of probation is to give the defendant an 
opportunity to be rehabilitated under proper control and supervision." State v. Mummert, 
98 Idaho 452, 454 (1977). "In determining whether to revoke probation a court must 
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consider whether probation is meeting the objective of rehabilitation while also providing 
adequate protection society." State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, (Ct. App. 1995). 
court 
Idaho at 392. 
consider the defendant's before during probation. Roy, 113 
In this case, Mr. Yost submits that the district court abused its discretion by 
revoking his probation because the violations did not justify revocation. As explained 
Mr. Yost's counsel, the only barrier between Mr. Yost and his treatment was its cost. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.16, L.21-p.19, L.14; Tr. Vol. II, p.4, L.25-p.8, L.3.) There was no allegation 
that Mr. Yost failed to attend treatment for any reason other than his inability to pay. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.19, Ls.2-4.) Mr. Yost wanted treatment, and he fully appreciated the need 
for treatment. (Tr. Vol. I, p.20, Ls.19-20, 18, Ls.1-2, p 19, Ls.15-22; Tr. Vol. II, p.8, 
Ls.10-14.) For example, he worked the graveyard shift at a manufacturing plant to 
ensure that he could attend treatment. (Tr. Vol. I, p.17, Ls.1-2, p.18. Ls.2-5.) But, like 
many individuals, Mr. Yost struggled to follow a budget and stay up-to-date on all his 
expenses. Then, in April of 2015, Mr. Yost injured himself at the manufacturing plant, 
which compounded his financial difficulties (Tr. Vol II. p.5, Ls.9-17; Def.'s Ex. A, 
pp.13-14.) In order to succeed on probation, Mr. Yost simply needed instruction and 
guidance to learn how to manage his finances, which he specifically requested at the 
second disposition hearing. (Tr. Vol. II, p.6, L.25-p.7, L. 11, p.8, Ls.17-24.) Instead of 
punishing Mr. Yost for his inability to pay with a twenty-five year prison sentence, 
Mr. Yost should have been given an opportunity to develop these money-management 
skills while on probation. 
Other facts indicate the district court abused its discretion by revoking Mr. Yost's 
probation because his probation was achieving its rehabilitative objective. Mr. Yost had 
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been sober for almost two years. (Tr. VoL I, p.20, Ls.10-14.) Remaining sober was an. 
accomplishment for as he began drinking alcohol age nineteen, consuming at 
beers a day. Vol. I, Ls.10-14; Presentence Investigation Report 
("PSl"), 5 p.36.) Further, the initial probation violations for viewing pornography and 
accessing the Internet did not occur again once Mr. Yost had the funds to pay for 
treatment. Mr. Yost's counsel explained, "He knows that when he is in treatment and 
attending those sessions like he's supposed to be, the issues that arose in that 
probation violation don't come up in his life." (Tr. Vol. II, p.8, Ls.10-14.) In fact, the 
psychosexual evaluation found that Mr. Yost's treatment needs could be met in the 
community. (PSI, p.18.) Similarly, the Addendum to the PSI following Mr. Yost's rider 
found that he was amenable to sex offender treatment and recommended probation. 
(PSI, pp.52, 55.) In addition, Mr. Yost had full-time employment and a stable residence. 6 
(R, p.150.) He also met with his probation officer as directed. (R, p.150.) Based on 
these facts, Mr. Yost's probation was achieving its rehabilitative objective. Mr. Yost 
submits that the district court abused its discretion by revoking probation or, in the 
alternative, by failing to further reduce his sentence in light of his progress on probation. 
5 Citations to the PSI refer to the sixty-three page electronic file titled "Appeal #43313 
Jess Wade Yost Cont. Exhibits." 
6 Mr. Yost lived with his parents, but he paid them rent. (PSI, p.55; Tr. Vol. 11, p.6, Ls.7-
12.) 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Yost respectfully requests that the district court's order revoking probation be 
vacated and his case be remanded to district court a new disposition hearing. 
Alternatively, he requests that this Court reinstate probation or further reduce his 
sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 24th day of November, 2 
puty State Appellate Public Defender 
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